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To many of us rules of procedure are nebulous and for that reason
we emphasize substantive rules of law even though most of us know
the importance of the former. The authors hope in the following
material to remove some of this cloudiness from one limited phase
of procedure, that of "fact finding." This article is meant to be of
assistance to trial judges on whom the final responsibility for prepara-
tion of the findings rests. It is also aimed at counsel who may assist
in the preparation or who may object to the findings made by the
court. Lastly, students should be aware of the fact-finding process
that the trial court has gone through when studying appellate court
decisions.
Although the basis of the material is derived from federal pro-
cedure, the advice and the suggestions should in the main be applica-
ble to most state proceedings. We shall attempt to illustrate (1)
the purpose of the findings, (2) when they are required, (3) how
they should be prepared, (4) their effect on appeal, and (5) the
effect of a failure to make the necessary findings.
I. WHAT Is THE PURPOSE OF FINDINGS?
Findings of fact serve a threefold purpose. One of these is to
assist the trial court in the adjudication process; or, to quote Judge
J. Skelly Wright, to prevent "shooting from the hip." He added:
Sometimes people say their first impressions are probably right.
Well, that may obtain with reference to informed guesses, but when
you are deciding a lawsuit, a second impression after studying,
after consideration, after analysis of the facts and the law, some-
times gives you a better result, a more reliable result than the
a Bruce V. Wagner prepared this article from an outline of cases and comments
compiled by Judge Carter for his use at the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference.
Judge Carter in maling his syllabus relied on a memorandum and collection
of cases prepared by Charles Powell, Chief Judge of the United States District
Court, E.D. Washington.
f United States District Judge, Southern District of California. A.B., Pomona
College, 1924; J.D., University of Southern California, 1927.
t B.S., Marquette University, 1953; LL.B., University of San Diego, School
of Law, 1963.
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first impression which you had before you had an opportunity to
consider and deliberate, which are the warp and the woof of the
adjudicatory process.'
Judge Frank in United States v. Forness2 stressed the importance
of fact-finding:
It is sometimes said that the requirement that the trial judge file
findings of fact is for the convenience of the upper courts. While
it does serve that end, it has a far more important purpose-that
of evoking care on the part of the trial judge in ascertaining the
facts. For, as every judge knows, to set down in precise words
the facts as he finds them is the best way to avoid carelessness
in the discharge of that duty: Often a strong impression that, on
the basis of the evidence, the facts are thus-and-so gives way when
it comes to expressing that impression on paper. The trial court is
the most important agency of the judicial branch of the govern-
ment precisely because on it rests the responsibility of ascertaining
the facts. When a federal trial judge sits without a jury, that re-
sponsibility is his. And it is not a light responsibility since, unless
his findings are "clearly erroneous", no upper court may disturb
them. To ascertain the facts is not a mechanical act. It is a difficult
art, not a science. It involves skill and judgment. As fact finding
is a human undertaking, it can, of course, never be perfect and
infallible. For that very reason every effort should be made to
render it as adequate as it humanly can be.8
The second purpose of the findings is to serve other courts where
issues of estoppel by judgment or res judicata are involved. A later
court looking at a judgment based on such findings must know pre-
cisely what was decided, and this cannot be determined by the judg-
ment alone, since: a) Rule 15 (b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP), in substance provides that the pleadings are changed by
the evidence introduced; and b) FRCP Rule 54(c) states in sub-
stance that the judgment is what you prove regardless of what you
plead. It becomes obvious that the findings of fact are extremely
important in defining for future cases the precise limitations of the
issues and the determination thereon.
The third purpose of findings is to inform the court of appeals
of the basis for the judgment. The problems that can occur because
of poor findings of fact are well illustrated in the case of Irish v.
United States.' This was an action under the Federal Tort Claims
1 PRocEEDINGs FoR NEWLy Apponr UNrr=D STATES DisnucT JuDcas 163
(1963).
2 125 F. 2d 928 (2d Cir. 1942).
a Id. at 942-43.
4 225 F. 2d 3 (9th Cir. 1955).
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Act where the plaintiff, a minor, was struck by a mail truck driven
by one Smith. As to the question of liability the trial court submitted
only one statement: "It is not true that the said Smith negligently
drove, operated, maintained or controlled the said mail truck ...
That it is not true that the collision or the injuries sustained by
the said minor David Irish proximately resulted from any negligence
of the defendants or either of them."5
District Judge Wiig, writing the opinion for the court, commented
that "a mere statement of law is not sufficient, for negligence de-
pends on the conduct under the circumstances."'6 The findings
should be so exclusive as to give the appellate court a clear under-
standing of the basis of the trial court's decision, and to enable it
to determine the ground on which the trial court reached the deci-
sion. He further stated that "had the court set out in its findings
of fact the evidence believed, or the reasons no negligence could
be found, this discussion would be unnecessary."' The opinion then
reviewed the testimony of the driver of the truck, and of the only
eye-witness to the accident. The latter's testimony was contradictory
and the judge commented that the witness, a minor, seemed to have
an affinity for any leading question which he could answer with a
yes. He concluded that the findings of the trial court provided no
understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision nor did they
give any hint as to the factual basis for the ultimate conclusion.
Therefore, the case was remanded for the purpose of making ap-
propriate findings of fact, if possible; if not, then the judgment
would be reversed.
Circuit Judge Chambers, concurred in the opinion' believing that
Judge Wiig's solution was a reasonable one. However, Circuit Judge
Healy dissented,' believing that the court's finding of no negligence
was contrary to the evidence and thus clearly erroneous. It should
be obvious that had the trial court made its findings explicit the
main appellate issue would never have arisen.
This conclusion follows since FRCP Rule 52 (a) prescribes that
findings of fact in actions tried without a jury shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the op-
portunity of a trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The Supreme Court in United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co."° stated:
5 Id. at 5.
a ibid.
7 Id. at 7.
S Id. at 8.
9 Ibid.
30 333 U.S. 364 (1947).
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It was intended, in all actions tried upon the facts without a jury,
to make applicable the then prevailing equity practice. Since judicial
review of findings of trial courts does not have statutory or con-
stitutional limitations on judicial review of findings by adminis-
trative agencies or by a jury, this Court may reverse findings of
fact by a trial court where "dearly erroneous." The practice in
equity prior to the present Rules of Civil Procedure was that the
findings of the trial court, when dependent upon oral testimony
where the candor and the credibility of the witnesses would best
be judged, had great weight with the appellate court. The findings
were never conclusive, however.' 1
The court then defined the "clearly erroneous" rule as follows: "A
finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been com-
mitted.'
12
II. WHEN ARE FINDINGS GENERALLY REQUIRED?
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a court to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law in several instances. FRCP
Rule 52 requires findings in all non-jury cases prior to entry of
judgment. FRCP Rule 41 (b) also requires such findings of fact and
conclusions of law where the court grants defendant's motion for
dismissal at the close of Plaintiff's evidence for failure to prove a
case.
Prior to the 1963 amendment of FRCP Rule 41 (b) such findings
were required in a case tried by a jury as well as in a case tried
without a jury. In the jury situation then, a motion for an involuntary
dismissal under FRCP Rule 41 (b) overlapped with a motion for a
directed verdict, FRCP Rule 50(a). In Makowsky v. Povlick,'3 a
jury case, the defendant's motion for dismissal under FRCP Rule
41(b) was granted; however, the court did not make the required
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellate court, there-
fore, treated the motion as one for a directed verdict and accepted
as true all the facts favorable to the plaintiff which the evidence
tended to prove and drew all reasonable inferences against the de-
fendants.
In O'Brien v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,4 also a jury case,
the lower court granted defendant's motion for dismissal under
FRCP Rule 41(b); however, it did make the required findings of
11 Id. at 394-95.
12 Id. at 395.
13 262 F. 2d 13 (3d Cir. 1959).
14 293 F. 2d 1 (3d Cir. 1960).
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fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff on appeal asserted that the
findings were made in a light most favorable to the defendant rather
than to the plaintiff. The appellate court stated that in a jury case
the question involved in a motion for involuntary dismissal can only
be one of law and that the motion should have been for a directed
verdict under which no findings of fact are necessary. 5 The court
then disregarded the findings and reviewed the entire evidence.
The 1963 amendment to FRCP Rule 41(b) has clarified this
somewhat confusing area. The Rule as amended will apply only to
non-jury cases where such findings will be necessary. It is clear that
in a case tried by a jury, the proper motion will be one for a directed
verdict.
It should be noted that there are several areas where the Rules
do not require findings of fact or conclusions of law. FRCP Rules
56 and 52(a) do not require findings in a motion for summary
judgment. The case of Filson v. Fountain6 cites with approval a
statement made in Lindsey v. Leavy: 7 "Since a summary judgment
presupposes that there are no triable issues of fact, findings of fact
and conclusions of law are not required in rendering judgment, al-
though the court may make such findings with or without request.
Failure to make . . . findings and conclusions is not error."18
In Gurley v. Wilson," the court reiterated that such findings
were unnecessary to a summary judgment; however, it did point out
that such findings could often be helpful to the appellate court if
made by the trial court."0 In line with this view the Southern
District of California has adopted local rule 3 (d) (2) which requires
proposed findings and conclusions to be served with the motion for
summary judgment.
Nor are findings and conclusions required under FRCP Rule 12
as amended in 1946.1 However, if there are factual issues which
are being determined, findings should be prepared. For example,
residence may be a contested issue of fact in a venue problem. In
King v. Wall & Beaver St. Corp.,2 the defendant moved for a
preliminary hearing under FRCP Rule 12(d) on the defense of
improper venue, and for summary judgment of dismissal under
FRCP Rule 56. Pleadings, affidavits, and depositions were submitted
"5 Id. at 9.
16 171 F. 2d 999, 1001 n.4 (D. C. Cir. 1948).
I7 149 F. 2d 899 (9th Cir. 1945).
Is 149 F. 2d at 902.
'9 239 F. 2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
20 Id. at 958.
21 See Magicison v. Duggan, 180 F. 2d 473 (8th Cir. 1950); FRCP Rule 52(a).
22 145 F. 2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
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to the court, and the court did conduct a preliminary hearing, giving
the plaintiffs opportunity to bring forward any other evidence on
the issue of the defendant's domicile. Under such circumstances the
court ruled that such a preliminary hearing was not a summary
proceeding, but a separate trial of separate issues. "Consequently, the
lower court was justified, indeed, was required, to make findings
of fact."2
Since the King case was decided in 1944, prior to the 1946
amendment to FRCP Rule 12, the question now is whether the
above statement still holds true. Moore's Federal Practice points out
that "although the literal language of the 1946 amendment stating
that findings are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12
may obviate the above decision, we do not believe that it should for
two reasons. The 1946 amendment should be read in conjunction
and harmonized with the earlier provision of the rule requiring find-
ings in all actions tried upon the facts."'24
Moore further suggests that such findings be made on Rule 12 (b)
motions: 1) for lack of jurisdiction over subject matter; 2) for
lack of jurisdiction over person; 3) for improper venue; 4) for in-
sufficiency of process; and 5) for insufficiency of service of process."u
This suggestion has merit since not all questions under the Rule
will be limited to matters of law, and a district court may have to
determine facts in ruling on such motions.
FRCP Rule 52 (a) also makes necessary findings of fact and con-
clusions of law where there is a trial with an advisory jury. In Reachi
v. Edmond,6 the court made a finding contrary to that of the ad-
visory jury. The appellant contended that the trial court should not
have overturned the jury verdict and that its findings were clearly
erroneous. However, the appellate court ruled that the advisory ver-
dict was not binding upon the trial court, nor that it in any way
affected the limitation placed upon an appellate court by FRCP Rule
52(a) to the effect that findings of fact are not to be set aside
unless dearly erroneous.
Another area that may require a court to make findings on issues
is that of special verdicts. Under FRCP Rule 49(a), if the court
in submitting interrogatories to the jury omits any issue of fact,
each party, unless he makes a timely demand, waives his right to a
trial by jury of that issue. In the case of Ingersoll v. Mason,
2 7
23 Id. at 381.
24 5 Moons, FEImuI PRAcTicE It 52.08 at 2673 (2d ed. 1951).
25 Id. at 2674.
26 277 F. 2d 850 (9th Cir. 1960).
27 254 F. 2d 899 (8th Cir. 1958).
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the court omitted the issue of contributory negligence on the part
of the cross-complainant; no interrogatory bearing on that question
was submitted to the jury or requested by either party. The trial
court made a finding that there was not contributory negligence and
the appellant asserted error. The appellate court held that in these
circumstances under FRCP Rule 49(a) it became the duty of the
trial court to make a finding and that the appellate court could not
disturb such a finding unless it could be said to be clearly erroneous.
FRCP Rule 52 also requires findings in cases where the govern-
ment is a party. In United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,2" the Supreme
Court stated that the Rule, providing that the findings of fact shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous and that due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses, applies to appeals by the government as well as to
those by other litigants, and there is no exception which permits the
government, even in an antitrust case, to ask the appellate court
for what virtually amounts to a trial de novo on the record of find-
ings as to intent, motive, and design 9 Therefore, in these cases
also, only those findings that are clearly erroneous will be set aside.
A year later, in United States v. Fotopulos,0 it was held that since
under the Federal Tort Claims Act Congress chose to deprive the
litigants of a right to trial by jury, the findings of the trial judge
take on a greater significance than in an ordinary civil court action.'
Other specific areas where findings are required are patent in-
fringement cases,"2 copyright infringement actions," and requests for
declaratory judgments.3
On the other hand, it is well established that findings are not
necessary as to facts admitted in pleadings. In Armstrong Paint &
Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corporation," an infringement of
trademark case, the defendant admitted "that the name 'Nu-Enamel'
has come to mean and is understood to mean . . ., the plaintiff
and the plaintiff's products only, and the word 'Nu-Enamel' is a
mark by which the goods of the plaintiff are distinguished from
other goods of the same class."3 The Supreme Court, therefore, ruled
that since the defendant conceded the secondary meaning of the
plaintiff's mark no evidence or finding was necessary.
28 338 U.S. 338 (1949).
29 Id. at 341-42.
SO 180 F. 2d 631 (9th Cir. 1950).
81 Id. at 634.
82 Hycon Mfg. Co. v. Koch & Sons, 219 F. 2d 353 (9th Cir. 1955).
a8 Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F. 2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
34 Kochtitzky v. John A. Denie's Sons Co., 153 F. 2d 520 (6th Cir. 1946).
35 305 U.S. 315 (1938).
8 Id. at 320-21.
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The more recent case of Malh Toi v. Brownell3" also holds that
neither proof nor finding is required in support of an allegation
admitted in the pleadings. However, it would seem to be the better
practice to include in the findings all admissions from pleadings and
all admitted facts from the pre-trial order.
Nor are findings necessary when pertaining to immaterial issues.
In Woodhead v. Wilkinson," a negligence case, the defendant com-
plained on appeal that the trial court had made no finding on the
issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence. The California Supreme
Court stated that a finding on the issue of contributory negligence
would not be necessary since the trial court made a finding that the
defendant's negligent acts were the sole and proximate cause of
the injury. This follows from the rule that findings and conclusions
are required on every material issue.39
III. ARE THERE PARTICULAR CASES OR SITUATIONS IN WHICH
FINDINGS MAY OR MAY NOT BE REQUIRED?
1. Admiralty.
Admiralty Rule 46 4 requires the trial court to find the facts
specifically and to state separately its conclusions of law. This rule
was adopted in 1930, and is now well established by case law. As
early as 1942, Judge Learned Hand in Petterson Lighterage & Tow-
ing Corp. v. New York Central R. Co.41 made it obvious that the
"unless clearly erroneous" provision of FRCP Rule 52 (a) will apply
to admiralty cases. In 1952, in Griffith v. Gardner,' the court con-
cluded that findings in an admiralty case may represent the judgment
of the trial court on the mass of details involving not only the trust-
worthiness of witnesses but other appropriate inferences that could
be drawn from the evidence. The later cases of Panama Canal Co. v,
Sociedad de T.M.S.A.4" and Founders' Ins. Co. v. Rogers" make it
clear that any review of the findings in an admiralty case is cir-
cumscribed by FRCP Rule 52 (a).
Despite Admiralty Rule 45," providing that further proof may
be taken by leave of the appellate court in such a matter as may be
described by statute or by such court, it has been made clear in
37 219 F. 2d 642 (9th Cir. 1955).
38 181 Cal. 599, 185 Pac. 851 (1919).
s9 See United States v. Seminole Nation, 299 U.S. 417 (1937), wherein the
Supreme Court states that a judgment may not be upheld which is not sup-
ported by definite findings of fact extending to all essential issues.
40 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2073 (1958).
41 126 F. 2d 992 (2d Cir. 1942).
42 196 F. 2d 698 (9th Cir. 1952).
43 272 F. 2d 726 (5th Cir. 1959).
44 281 F. 2d 332 (9th Cir. 1960).
45 28 U.S.C. foil. § 2073 (1958).
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McAllister v. United States4" that there no longer is a trial de novo
in the circuit court. The Supreme Court cites Judge Hand's opinion
in Petterson Lighterage & Towing Corp. v. New York-Central R.
Co." Judge Hand points out that although the rule still remains, it is
substantially an anachronism, in that,
there is no "manner" [by which to take further proof) consistent
with Rule 46 except to have the District Judge take it, or at
least to have it referred to him in the first instance after it has
been taken. This is true because as soon as new evidence is
taken the old findings are necessarily superseded; findings are not
findings when they rest upon only a part of the evidence, and
to satisfy rule 46 new findings must be made. Thus Rule 45
at most does no more than vest final discretion in this court as
to whether new evidence shall be taken at all... 48
In admiralty cases a finding of seaworthiness is usually a finding
of fact and the Supreme Court ordinarily will not, just as in other
cases, review the concurrent findings of fact of the two lower federal
courts. 49 However, negligence and unseaworthiness are not equiva-
lent. In Royal Mail Lines, Ltd. v. Peck,5" a case involving an action
by a stevedore against a ship and indemnity over by the ship against
the stevedoring company employing the plaintiff, there was a jury
verdict as to the negligence of the ship to the injured stevedore. The
trial court then made a finding of fact as to the unseaworthiness of
the ship and denied the indemnity claim against the stevedoring
company which was based on a contractual obligation for its em-
ployees to perform work in a proper manner. The court commented
that "a finding of negligence is neither a substitute foundation for,
nor a finding of unseaworthiness."51 Therefore the case was remanded
for further findings on the claim for indemnity.
2. Negligence and Unseaworthiness.
Although not always necessary, it is certainly a better practice
to state the basic facts rather than conclusory facts in the findings.
In Ramos v. Matson Navigation Co.," the plaintiff, a cook, al-
leged that laundry bags were irregularly and improperly piled so
that one fell upon him, causing injury to his back. In filing his
claim he charged that the vessel was unseaworthy in that the stow-
age of the laundry was unsafe and, accordingly, he was not pro-
vided with a safe area in which to work. Secondly, he charged negli-
46 348 U.S. 19 (1954).
47 Id. at 20.
48 126 F. 2d at 996.
49 See Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1943).
50 269 F. 2d 857 (9th Cir. 1959).
51 Id. at 860.
52 316 F. 2d 128 (9th Cir. 1963).
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gence under the Jones Act based upon the same facts. The trial
court made the somewhat general findings of seaworthiness and lack
of negligence on the part of the ship's owners, agents or employees.
It also made a finding of fact that the libelant was an unreliable
and untrustworthy witness.
On appeal the libelant contended that the findings were nothing
more than conclusions. The appellate court stated that a finding as
to negligence or unseaworthiness is one of fact and would not be
upset unless clearly erroneous. But it also stated: "At the same time,
we think it better practice for the court to make enough findings
as to what actually happened, so that the parties and this court can
appraise the ultimate finding as to negligence or unseaworthiness.
... But for reasons hereafter stated, we do not think it necessary
or desirable to do so here.
' 53
The reasons were no doubt that the plaintiff was shown to have
had a series of accidents aboard various ships, each resulting in a
back injury, and that his testimony contained many inconsistencies.
Further, he was impeached by a private detective who had watched
him mow his lawn and lift the mower over his fence. The court
concluded that the trial court simply had not believed the plaintiff
either as to how the accident occurred or as to his claimed injuries
and that there would be no need to send the case back to have the
court tell them so in more detail.
The dissenting judge would have remanded the case for more
specific findings as to how the laundry bag was stored, whether it
fell, and if so, whether it struck the plaintiff." He relied on a
statement made in Dalehite v. United States:55
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52 (a), in terms, contem-
plates a system of findings which are "of fact" and which are
"concise." The well-recognized difficulty of distinguishing between
law and fact dearly does not absolve district courts of their duty
in hard and complex cases to make a studied effort toward definite-
ness. Statements conclusory in nature are to be eschewed in favor
of statements of the preliminary and basic facts on which the
District Court relied. Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319
US 415, 87 L ed 1485, 63 S Ct 1141, and cases cited. Otherwise,
their findings are useless for appellate purposes. In this particular
case, no proper review could be exercised by taking the "fact"
findings of 'negligence" at face value. And, to the extent that
they are of law, of course they are not binding on appeal. E.g.,
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.
53 Id. at 131.
54 Id. at 133.
53 346 U.S. 15 (1952).
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340 US 147, 153, 154 and concurring opinion at 155, 156, 95 L ed
162, 167, 168, 169,71 S Ct 153. (Emphasis added.)56
In the Kelley case the Supreme Court commented that it was
not its function to search the record and analyze the evidence so as
to make findings that the trial court had failed to make. 7
3. Credibility of Witness.
It is proper and sometimes necessary for the court to make a find-
ing as to the credibility of a witness. As we saw in the Ramos case,""
the court found as a fact that the witness was unreliable. That a trial
court may reject uncontradicted testimony which it finds not worthy
of belief is amply supported by a statement made in that case:
We have long since abjured the notion that a court cannot reject
"uncontradicted" testimony that it finds not worthy of belief. (cit-
ing cases.) The rule is equally applicable to testimony given by
deposition (Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 9 Cir., 1958, 257 F. 2d 744,
746), or by stipulation (Tucker v. Brady, 9 Cir., 1962, 305 F. 2d
550, 552). As we said in Tucker, "By the device of refraining
from putting (the witness') demeanor to the test, appellant should
not be able to render credible as a matter of law that which
otherwise might have been disbelieved."59
In Irish v. United States,60 the court remanded the case since
there was no finding as to the reliability of the witnesses. But, as
we noted above in Griffith v. Gardner6 "... . 'findings of fact' may
* .. reflect the ultimate judgment of the court on a mass of details
involving not merely trustworthiness of witnesses but other appro-
priate inferences that were drawn from living testimony which elude
proof in a cold appellate record.""2
4. Bankruptcy.
General Order in Bankruptcy No. 376" makes FRCP Rule 52 (a)
applicable and a bankruptcy court must "find the facts specifically,"
and make written fiindings of fact and conclusions of law. In Costello
v. Fazzio,"4 it is pointed out that General Order in Bankruptcy No.
47" requires the district court and the appellate court to accept the
findings of the referee in bankruptcy unless such are clearly erro-
neous. But where the findings are based upon conflicting evidence or
56 Id. at 24 n. 8.
57 Kelley v. Everglades Drainage District, 319 U.S. 415, 421-22 (1943).
58 Ramos v. Matson Navigation Co., 316 F. 2d 128 (9th Cir. 1963).
59 Id. at 132.
60 225 F. 2d 3 (9th Cir. 1955).
61 196 F. 2d 698 (9th Cir. 1952).
,02 Id. at 701.
63 11 U.S.C. foll. § 53 (1958).
64 256 F. 2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958).
65 11 U.S.C. foil. §53 (1958).
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where the credibility of a witness is a factor the district court and,
on appeal, a court of appeals will seldom hold such a finding clearly
erroneous.
66
However, where a referee reaches a conclusion from given facts
neither the district court nor the court of appeals is so limited, and
in such a situation either court can reach a proper conclusion from
the given facts. Where there is a lack of findings of fact supporting
the order of the district court, the case must be remanded so that
the deficiency can be supplied."7 In In the Matter of Cesari,8 there
was an ultimate finding that section 67d(3) of the Bankruptcy
Act, 9 dealing with voidable transfers, was applicable. On appeal the
court pointed out that to sustain this ultimate finding it was neces-
sary that the referee make subsidiary findings showing that the trans-
fer fell within all the conditions set out under section 67d(3)."'
So here again we see that the findings must be explicit enough to
enable the reviewing court to determine the ground on which the
conclusions were reached.
In Perry v. Baumann,71 a petition for an agricultural composition,
there were several motions made to dismiss on several grounds. The
trial court entered an order dismissing the proceeding but it did not
indicate which of the several motions was granted nor on what ground
the dismissal was ordered. The appellate court, holding FRCP Rule
52(a) applicable, remanded with directions to find the facts and
make conclusions of law prior to the entry of judgment.
A person aggrieved by an order of a referee may file for a petition
of review by a judge under section 39(c) of the Bankruptcy Act.72
Section 2 (a) (10) of the act provides that courts of bankruptcy (Dis-
trict Courts) shall have jurisdiction to "consider records, findings and
orders certified to the judges by referees, and confirm, modify, or
reverse such findings and orders, or return such records with in-
structions for further proceedings."7
As we said above, General Order 47 requires the referee to sub-
mit his findings of fact and conclusions of law in his report. How-
ever, the same order also states: "The judge after hearing may adopt
a report or may modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or
66 256 F. 2d at 908.
67 See Kline v. Rancho Montana de Oro Inc., 263 F. 2d 764 (9th Cir. 1959).
68 217 F. 2d 424 (7th Cir. 1954).
69 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).
70 217 F. 2d at 427.
71 122 F. 2d409 (9th Cir. 1941).
72 11 U.S.C. § 67 (1958); as amended II U.S.C. (Supp. II, 1960); for a
general analysis see 2 CoLLmn, BAm~mxucy § 39.16 (14th ed. 1959).
73 11 U.S.C. foil. § 11 (1958).
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may receive further evidence or may recommit it with instructions."
(Emphasis added.) 74 Notwithstanding the above language, the scope
of review of the referee's findings involves an analysis of the type
of testimony upon which the referee based his findings. If the find-
ing is based on demeanor testimony involving credibility, such must
be accorded a high degree of weight. On the other hand, if the
findings are based on documentary and other nondemeanor testimony,
or on inferences, deductions, or conclusions from uncontradicted, ad-
mitted or stipulated fact, the findings are subject to a lesser degree
of weight.75
The Supreme Court in Kelley v. Everglades Drainage District"
points out that the nature and degree of exactness of the findings
depends on the circumstances of the particular case. The case should
also be noted for its good discussion of findings in various bankruptcy
situations.
5. Master's Report.
Under FRCP Rule 53(e) (1) a master may be required to sub-
mit findings of fact and conclusions of law. Also under FRCP Rule
52 (a) the findings of the master shall be the findings of the court
to the extent that they are adopted by the court. And under FRCP
Rule 53 (e) (2), in non-jury cases the court shall accept the mas-
ter's findings unless clearly erroneous. However, it is pointed out in
W.R.B. Corp. v. Geer" that the district court should at some stage
of the proceedings determine as a judicial matter that the master's
findings meet the "unless dearly erroneous" test and are the product
of the correct principles of law. 8 In W.R.B. Corp. the appellate
court remanded since "a consideration of the record leaves us in
doubt that the district judge gave the review of the record and the
successor master's report which the law requires."79
6. Special Verdicts.
This area was covered above in Section II. However, it should
be noted that FRCP Rule 49 (a) provides that where the court fails
to submit an issue to the jury and where the court itself fails to
make a finding, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord
with the judgment on the special verdict. This rule was applied as
early as 1939 in Hinshaw v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co.8"
74 11 U.S.C. foil. § 53 (1958).
75 See generally, 5 MooaE, FE1mLn PAcnICE Ic 53.12 (6) at 2994-95 (2d ed.
1951).
78 319 U.S. 415 (1943).
77 313 F. 2d 750 (5th Cir. 1963).
78 Id. at 753.
79 Ibid.
80 104 F. 2d 45 (8th Cir. 1939).
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In that case the plaintiff insurance company petitioned for a declara-
tory judgment against the administratrix of deceased annuitant to de-
termine the rights under an annuity policy. The defendant cross-
complained, alleging fraud and seeking rescission. The jury returned
a special verdict in the form of fifteen findings. None of the find-
ings were to the effect that the deceased relied upon any statement
made by the plaintiff's agent. Such reliance is a necessary element
for actionable fraud.
The trial court found for the plaintiffs, and the defendants on
appeal contended that the element of reliance should be presumed.
The reviewing court held that since there was no finding to the
effect that no fiduciary relationship eisted, FRCP Rule 49(a) is
applicable. It then concluded that "[Ilt will be assumed that the
court made a finding in accordance with the judgment."'" Le. there
was no reliance.
7. General Verdict and Interrogatories.
Where there is a general verdict accompanied by answers to in-
terrogatories, the court makes no findings since, under FRCP Rule
49(b) if the answers are consistent with one another but one or
more is inconsistent with the verdict, the court may direct a verdict
in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict,
or return the jury for further consideration or grant a new trial; and
if the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more
is inconsistent with the general verdict the court may return the jury
for further consideration or grant a new trial.
8. Advisory Jury.
FRCP Rule 39(c) provides that in actions not triable of right
by a jury the court may try any issue with an advisory jury. Under
section II of this article it was pointed out that FRCP Rule 52 (a)
requires findings of fact and conclusions of law to be made where
there is a trial with an advisory jury. It was also noted that the
advisory verdict was not binding on the trial court. In Greenwood v.
Greenwood,"2 the court mentioned that even though such a find-
ing is not binding the trial court may adopt it as its own."
In Aetna Ins. Co. v. Paddock,4 the court stated:
Some of the findings of the jury may be adopted and others re-
jected but all findings of the jury must be treated merely as ad-
visory. [Citing case.] The remedy where the court has adopted
the findings of a jury is not for a new trial but to require the
81 Id. at 49.
82 234 F. 2d 276 (3d Cir. 1956).
83 Id. at 278.
84 301 F. 2d 807 (5th Cir. 1962).
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trial court to make independent findings of fact, enter judgment
in accordance with those findings, and appeal therefrom, [Citing
case.] Exception to the findings of the jury which are adopted by
the court is by motion under Rule 52 (b) to set aside or amend
the findings.8 5
9. Jurisdiction.
Since the federal court is one of limited jurisdiction, jurisdiction
must always be alleged and proved. It follows then that the court
should make findings as to the facts which show jurisdiction; for
example, in a diversity case, a court should make findings to the
effect that the parties are citizens of certain states and that the
amount in controversy exceeds $10,000 exclusive of interest. The
court should then make a conclusion as to jurisdiction based on the
facts.
10. Search and Seizure.
Under Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6
"[A] person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move
... for the return of the property and to suppress for use of evidence
anything so obtained... ." The Rule also provides that the judge
may receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision.
The Rule does not require findings of fact and conclusions of law.
However, the better practice would seem to be that such findings
should be prepared since the facts if supported by the evidence would
be binding on the appellate court.8 7
11. Habeas Corpus.
Under FRCP Rule 81(a) (2), the Federal Rules apply to ap-
peals on habeas corpus proceedings. In Holiday v. Johnston"s the
the Supreme Court pointed out that the trial court and not a com-
missioner should hear testimony and make findings.8" In Wood v.
Howard,9" a habeas corpus proceeding, the court stated that "while
it does not affect the rights of the petitioner in this cause, the district
court should have made findings of fact and stated its conclusions of
law thereon."'" The importance of findings in such proceedings is
well illustrated in the case of Von Moltke v. Gillies,9" in which
the Supreme Court was divided, four justices would have reversed the
district court, three justices would have affirmed, and two justices
85 Id. at 811.
86 18 U.S.C. App. (1958).
87 See Nichols v. United States, 176 F. 2d 431 (8th Cir. 1949).
88 313 U.S. 342 (1941).
89 Id. at 350-52.
90 157 F. 2d 807 (7th Cir. 1946).
91 Id. at 808.
92 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
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were of the opinion that the record was inconclusive. Accordingly
the case was remanded to the district court with instructions to make
explicit findings on the questions of fact.
A prisoner in federal custody may make a motion under 28 U.S.C.
Section 2255" to vacate, set aside or to correct the sentence. This
motion then is in lieu of habeas corpus. The section expressly states:
"[U]nless the motions and the files and the records of the case
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court
shall... grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and
make findings of fact and conclusions of law. . . ." (Emphasis
added.)
In Michener v. United States,04 the trial court denied defendant's
motion under section 2255"5 after a hearing but without making
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellate court remanded
with directions to make findings and conclusions since "the re-
quirement of section 2255, title 28 U.S.C.A., with reference to the
making of findings of fact and conclusions of law is similar to that
embodied in Rule 52 (a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ..
12. Injunctions.
Under the requirements of FRCP Rule 52(a), a district court
in granting or refusing an interlocutory injunction shall set forth the
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds
of its action. In Carpenter's District Council v. Cicci,7 the court
concluded that this rule is mandatory. In 1962, the Third Circuit in
ICC v. Cardinale Trucking Corp." made its position, in relation
to the necessity of findings, fairly clear. In that case the trial court
filed no findings of fact nor did its opinion contain the necessary
findings. The court stated:
• . . it now becomes our duty to state that, in the future, unless
the court below makes, either in separate, numbered paragraphs,
or in its opinion, in conformity with Rule 52 (a), clear and concise
statements of the ultimate facts of the case, so that both the ap-
pellant and this court are fully apprised of the basis of its judg-
ment, the matter will be forthwith remanded in order that such
findings be made.00
It should be noted that since a necessary prerequisite for pre-
liminary injunction is irreparable injury, it follows that there must
93 (1958).
94 177 F. 2d 422 (8th Cir. 1949).
95 28 U.S.C. (1958).
I6 177 F. 2d at 424.
97 261 F. 2d 5 (6th Cir. 1958).
98 308 F. 2d 435 (3d Cir. 1962).
9 Id. at 437.
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be a finding to that effect.' 0 A finding of irreparable injury is
also a necessity in granting a temporary restraining order. FRCP
Rule 65 (b) requires that "every temporary restraining order granted
without notice shall . .. define the injury and state why it is ir-
reparable and why the order was granted without notice."
13. Contempt.
FRCP Rule 52(a) provides that findings are unnecessary on
motions except as provided in FRCP Rule 41(b). But Jewel Tea
Co. v. Kraus' ' points out that findings are usually appropriate,
especially so when a defendant is held on a motion for civil con-
tempt. This is true even though a trial court has a wide discretion
in enforcing its decrees. In Yanish v. Barber,' the court com-
mented that it would be an idle act to remand the case for find-
ings, since although the trial court made none, there was no dispute
or contradiction in the record.0 3 The court in American Cyanamide
Co. v. Sharff,"'0 although recognizing that FRCP Rule 52(a) was
not expressly applicable, stated: "In our opinion the case at bar is
one which preeminently requires findings of fact and conclusions of
law. . . .""' It would seem that here, too, although not expressly
required, the better practice would be to include findings of fact
and conclusions of law in contempt proceedings.
14. Naturalization Proceedings.
In the area of naturalization proceedings there seems to be a divi-
sion of opinion. The Ninth Circuit minority rule to the effect that
findings are not required under FRCP Rules 52 (a) and 81 (a) (2)
is presented in Wixman v. United States.0 6 It should be noted,
however, that the appellate court in that case was of the opinion
that the trial court had indicated its findings in an oral opinion
delivered from the bench. Under the majority rule the trial court
must make findings where the court examines witnesses but not
where the district court merely reviews and adopts an examiner's
findings and recommendations.
The majority indicate that FRCP Rule 52 (a) is mandatory unless
made inapplicable by FRCP Rule 81(a) (2) which provides:
"[TIhey [the rules] are not applicable otherwise than on appeal
except to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set
forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed
100 See Sims v. Greene, 161 F. 2d 87 (3d Cir. 1947).
101 204 F. 2d 549 (7th Cir. 1953).
102 232 F. 2d 939 (9th Cir. 1956).
103 Id. at 947.
-0 309 F. 2d 790 (3d Cir. 1962).
o105 Id. at 798.
100 167 F. 2d 808 (9th Cir. 1948).
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to the practice in actions at law or suits in equity: admission to
citizenship, habeas corpus, quo warranto and forfeiture of property
for violation of the statute of the United States." (Emphasis added.)
In Application of Murra,"°7 the court pointed out that there are
two methods by which a petition for naturalization may be disposed
of, namely: "(1) the court may act upon the report of an examiner
who has conducted a preliminary hearing and who is required to
make findings upon which his recommendation is predicated; and
(2) a hearing in open court where the witnesses must be examined
before the court and in the presence of the court."'08 The court
explains that while the naturalization statute requires the examiner
to make findings, there is no such statutory requirement on the part
of a court where it hears and decides the issues. It logically con-
dudes then that FRCP Rule 52(a) is applicable since there is no
other statutory procedure.0 9
But, where a petition has been referred to an examiner and the
petitioner does not demand a hearing before the court, there is
nothing upon which the district court can predicate findings of fact,
and therefore such -findings are unnecessary."' However, the ex-
aminer should make findings in order that the court may act upon
his recommendation.
15. Condemnation Cases.
In 1951 FRCP Rule 71A(a) became effective, thereby, making
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to eminent domain
proceedings. FRCP Rule 71A(h) provides that if a commission is
appointed, its "findings and report shall have the effect and be dealt
with by the court in accordance with the practice, prescribed in para-
graph (a) of subdivision (e) of Rule 53." Rule 53(e) (2) pro-
vides that "in an action to be tried without a jury the court shall
accept the master's findings of fact unless dearly erroneous."
These two sections were interpreted by the court in United States
v. Certain Parcels of Land in City of Philadelphia."' In that case
the appellants objected that the court did not make separate find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellate court pointed out
that findings of fact need not be in any particular form and in this
case the commission's reports were expressly adopted by the trial
court, a procedure which corresponds with the handling of findings
of fact usually employed by masters. It also explained that the review
-7 166 F. 2d 605 (7th Cir. 1948).
108 Id. at 606.
'19 Id. at 607.
110 See Jow Gin v. United States, 175 F. 2d 299 (7th Cir. 1949).
1-" 215 F. 2d 140 (3d Cir. 1954).
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of the commission's reports by the district court is properly a limited
one and that since both the trial court and the appellate court must
rely on the dead record either court may apply the correct rule of
law to the commission's reports.
A more difficult situation is presented where the district court re-
jects the commission's findings as clearly erroneous and makes find-
ings of its own. In United States v. Twin City Power Co. of
Georgia,"' the government contended that the question for the
appellate court was whether the findings of the commission were
dearly erroneous. The court referred to FRCP Rule 52(a) which
provides, in part: "The findings of a master, to the extent that the
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court."
Applying the inclusio anius est exclusio alteries rule of construction,
the court concluded that "it would seem to be implied, or to follow,
that the findings of a master, to the extent that the court rejects
them, are not within the protection of the clearly erroneous rule.""'
The court further concluded that the questions on appeal under
such circumstances are: "1. Whether the district court applied the
proper standard in considering the findings; 2. Whether it erred in
rejecting the findings of the commission as clearly erroneous; and
3. Whether, in turn, the findings made by the district court are
clearly erroneous."" 4 Circuit Judge Tuttle, dissenting, thought it was
the duty of the majority to state: "we think the commission's find-
ings were clearly erroneous and we would set them aside""' 5 rather
than the statement made by the majority: "We cannot say that the
district court erred in rejecting the commission's findings as clearly
erroneous or that the findings of the district court are themselves
clearly erroneous.""' 6
16. Review of Findings of a Federal Agency.
A district court need not make its own findings when it reviews
and approves an agency's findings. In Dispatch Shops v. Railroad
Retirement Board,"7 the court commented: "Where the question
before this court is whether or not the findings of an administrative
Board are based on substantial evidence, the court lacks the power
to make findings of fact contemplated by Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, [R]ule 52(a)....
212 253 F. 2d 197 (5th Cir. 1958).
.23 Id. at 203.
'124 Ibid.
"15 Id. at 206.
116 Id. at 204.
117 60 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); affirmed, 154 F. 2d 417 (2d Cir. 1946).
11s Id. at 108.
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IV. How SHOULD FINDINGS BE PREPARED?
1. Who Prepares the Findings?
Various judges have suggested that a requirement that both sides
submit their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law before
the trial starts would be helpful in the trial of a civil case, par.
ticularly a complicated one. If this practice is adopted, under each
proposed finding counsel should set forth in supporting the proposed
finding: a) the name of the witness, b) a summary of the proposed
testimony of the witness, and c) the documents to be offered in
support of the finding, attaching copies for the inspection of the
court.
Such a practice would seem beneficial in a complex case in ful-
filling the purpose of the findings as outlined above. FRCP Rule
52 (a) suggests that the court find the facts and state its conclusions
of law prior to entering judgment, which is certainly a logical ap-
proach. It would appear that if the proposed findings are submitted
prior to the receipt of evidence, the court could more easily determine
the factual issues while the evidence is quite fresh.
A practice in California and many western states is to ask the
lawyers to prepare the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judg-
ment. Judge Skelly Wright states that all the circuits except one have
denounced this practice,11 and quite properly so if the trial court
automatically signs them. By such a practice a court would shun its
duty of primary responsibility of fact finding. As Judge Wright
pointed out, the winning counsel is going to state the case for his
side as strongly as possible, which is only natural under the ad-
vocate system.' However, it is proper to have the lawyers sub-
mit their findings; but the judge should study them, pick and choose,
modify, insert his own views and language and, if necessary, com-
pletely revise them or send them back for revision with instructions
as to what he wants. Local Rule 7 (a), Southern District of California
requires counsel for the successful party to prepare findings and con-
clusions within five days.
2. Must the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Be Separately Stated?
FRCP Rule 52 (a) requires a separate statement of findings of
fact and conclusions of law. However, as pointed out in Walker v.
Lightfoot,' commingling will not ordinarily result in reversal un-
19 PROCEEDINGs FOR NEw-LY APomTED UNnmT STATES DiSTICuT JUDcES 166
(1963).
120 ibid.
21 124 F. 2d 3, 5 (9th Cir. 1941).
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less an appellant shows prejudice. Also, the courts will not reverse
because of the failure to comply literally with the provisions of
FRCP Rule 52 (a) if the findings, though found in the opinion of
the court or under the heading "Findings of Facts or Conclusions of
Law," are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues so
as to provide a basis for decision.'22 Improperly including a find-
ing as a conclusion or vice versa is not always fatal. In Central Ry.
Signal Co. v. Longden,"' an action for breach of fiduciary duty in
the diversion of a "corporate opportunity," the court commented that
the district court's finding with respect to corporate ratification and
laches, which was included in its conclusion of law, was as bind-
ing, though improperly termed a conclusion of law, as if it were
included in the findings of fact. Since it was actually a finding, the
error was immaterial.'24
If there is any doubt as to whether an item is a finding or a
conclusion, it would seem advisable to include the item under both
findings and conclusions. For example, "negligent" could be a find-
ing or a conclusion or both. In Gill v. United States,.25 the court
said: "That respondent was negligent was not found as a fact, but
as a conclusion of law, is of no significance, for negligence is amixed question of law and fact and a finding as to it may properly
be labeled either a 'finding of fact' or a 'conclusion of law'."' 26 The
important thing is that there is sufficient evidence to support a find-
ing of negligence no matter how it is labeled.
It should also be noted that conclusions of law may incorporate
citations of cases or text as authority. It is often desirable to insert
in the conclusions citations of a controlling authority, particularly in
a close case. Such a practice should be most helpful to a reviewing
court. However, as pointed out by Judge Wright: "[Elvidence
should not be included in your findings of fact and conclusions of
law. There should be raw facts when the trial judge feels they will
be helpful in showing the basis for his determination. There should
be intermediate facts; there should be ultimate facts. There should be
no evidence."'2
That statement is in line with one made in Carr v. Yokohama
Specie Bank, Ltd.:
128
[Tihe federal rule relating to findings of a trial court does not
require the court to make findings on all facts presented or to
122 See Alger v. United States, 171 F. 2d 667 (7th Cir. 1948).
2 194 F. 2d 310 (7th Cir. 1952).
124 Id. at 320.
'5 184 F. 2d 49 (2d Cir. 1950).
126 Id. at 54.
'2 Supra note 116, at 165.
128 200 F. 2d 251 (9th Cir. 1952).
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make detailed evidenciary findings; if the findings are sufficient
to support the ultimate conclusions of the court they are sufficient.
[Citing case.] Nor is it necessary that the trial court make findings
asserting the negative of each issue of fact raised. It is sufficient
if the special affirmative facts found by the court, construed as a
whole, negative each rejected contention. The ultimate test as to the
adequacy of findings will always be whether they are sufficiently
comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for
decision and whether they are supported by the evidence.... [Cit-
ing cases. 1 29
The need for explicity is well illustrated in Welsh Co. of Califor-
nia v. Strolee of California,' a patent infringement case, in which
the lower court was reversed because the findings were too broad
and conclusory. The court, relying on Dalehite v. United States,...
stated: "They do not reveal the 'basic facts on which the district
court relied.' ""3 Also since the expert testimony was quite im-
portant the court referred to the lack of any findings with respect
to the reliability of the witnesses.13
3. May the Opinion Contain the Findings and Conclusions?
FRCP Rule 52 (a) was amended in 1946 to provide "... if an
opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if
the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein." (Em-
phasis added.) The notes of the advisory committee on the amend-
ment to the rules state: "Consequently they (findings of fact and con-
clusions of law) should be part of the judge's opinion and decision,
either stated therein or stated separately. . . .But the judge need
only make brief, definite, pertinent findings and conclusions upon
the contested matters; there is no need for over-elaboration of de-
tail or particularization of facts...." The cases tend to show that
the courts have given this part of the rule a broad interpretation.
In Trentman v. City and County of Denver, Colorado,"3 4 the trial
court did not dictate into the record either the findings of fact or
the conclusions of law. Neither did it file formal written findings
of fact and conclusions of law, but it did file a written opinion which
contained them. The court found that a footnote to the opinion of
the trial court was in substance a finding of fact and that it must
be considered as such. The appellate court commented: "[Wihile
the opinion may not have been as complete as might have been
129 Id. at 255.
130 290 F. 2d 509 (9th Cir. 1961).
131 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
132 Welsh Co., 290 F. 2d at 510.
133 Id. at 512.
134 236 F. 2d 951 (10th Cir. 1956); cert. denied, 352 U. S. 943 (1956).
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desired in respect to the making of findings of fact, we think it
is wholly unnecessary to remand the case for the making of addi-
tional findings.""'
In Stone v. Farnell,'36 regarding a fraudulent sale of realty, a
finding of negligence was essential. The district judge, however, did
not submit such a finding in his findings of fact and conclusions of
law. But, fortunately for the appellee, the trial court submitted a
memorandum opinion containing statements about which the appel-
late court said: "Although the trial judge's statements are some-
what conclusionary in nature, they should be liberally construed, and
in that context we feel that they are sufficiently comprehensive and
pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for decision."''
In Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westing-
house Electric Corp.,3 ' the appellant requested that the case be
remanded for more specific findings. The action was a proceeding
involving applications of terms of a contract between the union and
employer. The trial court ordered the question to be submitted to
arbitration. The company complained that the findings were too in-
complete for adjudication in the reviewing court. The appellate court,
acknowledging that the trial court had not set out its findings in
numbered paragraphs, dismissed this contention on the ground that
the district court's opinion contained sufficient material to proceed
to the adjudication of the case.
However, it should be noted that even though findings may ap-
pear in the opinion, if there is a direct conflict between formal
findings and the findings in the opinion, the formal findings will
govern.1
3 9
V. SHOULD COUNSEL BE ADVISED OF THE BASIS OF
THE DECISION?
There should be no question that the formal findings should reflect
the facts as honestly found. In some courts the judge will literally
"sew up" a party by finding facts in such a way as to negate an
appeal. By fitting the facts too well established legal principles there
is no doubt that a trial judge could keep his batting average of re-
versals to a minimum due to the "clearly erroneous doctrine." But,
is such a practice in keeping with the high standard of responsibility
:135 Id. at 953.
136 239 F. 2d 750 (9th Cir. 1956).
137 Id. at 755.
188 283 F. 2d 93 (3d Cir. 1960).
139 See Plastino v. Mills, 236 F. 2d 32 (9th Cir. 1956); Osaka Shosen Kaisha,
Ltd. v. Angelos, Leitch and Co., Ltd., 301 F. 2d 59 (4th Cir. 1962).
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that the judiciary faces in fact finding? Circuit Judge Frank in
United States v. Forness"4 ' made some pertinent comments in this
area:
The correct finding, as near as may be, of the facts of the law
suit is fully as important as the application of the correct legal
rules to the facts as found. An impeccably "right" legal rule applied
to the "wrong" facts yields a decision which is as faulty as one
which results from the application of the "wrong" legal rule to
the "right" facts. The latter type of error, indeed, can be corrected
on appeal but the former is not subject to such correction unless
the appellant overcomes the heavy burden of showing that the
findings of fact are "dearly erroneous." Chief Justice Hughes once
remarked, "an unscrupulous administrator might be tempted to say
'let me find the facts for the people of my country, and I care
little who lays down the general principles."' That comment
should be extended to include facts found without due care as
well as unscrupulous fact-finding; for such lack of due care is less
likely to reveal itself than lack of scruples, which, we trust, seldom
exists. And Chief Justice Hughes' comment is just as applicable to
the careless fact finding of a judge as to that of an administrative
officer. The judiciary properly holds administrative officers to high
standards in the discharge of the fact-finding function. The Judi-
ciary should at least measure up to the same standards.'
4 '
The wiser course of action is for the judge to advise counsel of
the basis of his decision either orally from the bench, by a memor-
andum of decision, or by a written opinion. If counsel are to assist
in preparing findings, this gives them directions as to how to pro-
ceed. The best time to determine facts is when the evidence closes,
not on submission. The facts are usually clearly in mind at the close
of the evidence. If the court is in doubt as to the application of
the law to the case then it should find the facts from the bench
and let the lawyers brief the applicable law. And, let the chips fall
where they may.
VI. CAN FINDINGS BE AMENDED?
Under FRCP Rule 59 (a) in a non-jury action a court may open
the judgment, take additional evidence, amend the findings of fact
and conclusions of law or make new ones and direct the entry of a
new judgment. Such a motion to amend or alter the judgment
should be served within ten days of the entry of judgment under
FRCP Rule 59 (e). FRCP Rule 62 (b) also grants discretion to the
trial court to stay the proceedings pending the disposition of a motion
for amendment to the findings or for additional findings. Finally,
140 125 F. 2d 928 (2d Cir. 1942).
141 Id. at 942.
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FRCP Rule 73 (a) provides for the tolling of the running of the
time for appeal where the above motions are timely.
VII. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF FINDINGS ON APPEAL WHEN
THE ISSUES DECIDED ARE ON WRITTEN EVIDENCE?
A question that has caused some confusion is whether a circuit
court is bound by a trial court's findings, unless clearly erroneous,
where the fact issues are decided on written evidence alone. Two
divergent views have been formulated in answer to the question.
The late Judge Frank and Professor Moore espoused the rule that
in a case where the record was entirely documentary, the "clearly
erroneous" rule did not apply and that a reviewing court could draw
inferences and conclusions as easily as a trial judge. On the other
hand Judge Charles Clark, drafter of FRCP Rule 52(a), and Pro-
fessor Wright, editor of "Baron and Holtzoff,"'42 hold a contrary
view.
The case of Lundgren v. Freeman'. has an excellent discussion
on this problem. It points out that FRCP Rule 52 (a) incorporates
the type of review that previously was had in equity cases and that
"nothing in the history of review of equity cases or of law cases
tried without a jury suggests that the appellate court ever decides
issues of fact in the first instance, even where it considers itself full
qualified as the trial judge to do so.""' Because of this, it concludes
that the "Clark" view is favored by history. The court states:
"[W]e may not substitute our judgment if conflicting inferences
may be drawn from the established fact by reasonable men, and
the inferences drawn by the trial court are those that could have
been drawn by reasonable men."'45 The opinion goes on to say
that "Rule 52(a) should be construed to encourage appeals that
are based on a conviction that the trial court's decision has been
unjust; it should not be construed to encourage appeals that are based
on the hope that the appellate court will second-guess the trial court
. . . . Rule 52 (a) explicitly clearly applies where the trial court
has not had an opportunity to judge of the credibility of wit-
nesses."'
146
The Lundgren case, after citing cases supporting the "Clark" view
and the "Frank" view, points out that a recent Supreme Court case,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Duberstein,'"' strongly sug-
142 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, (1950).
143 307 F. 2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962).
'144 Id. at 114.
145 Id. at 113.
146 Id. at 113-14.
247 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
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gests that the "Clark" view as to review of findings based on undis-
puted facts is the correct one. The court commented:
The Supreme Court found that the question of whether there has
been a gift, for income tax purposes, is a question of fact, and
not a question of law; and the "clearly erroneous" test applies even
though it seems the basic facts are undisputed . . . A finding
of fact, to which the dearly erroneous rule applies, is a finding
based on the "fact finding tribunals experience with the main
springs of human conduct."
1 48
However, where the evidence before the trial court is entirely
written, the appellate court may make a finding of fact based on
the uncontroverted evidence where the trial court omitted to do so. 49
VIII. Is FAILURE TO MAKE A FINDING ALWAYS FATAL?
The case of Yanish v. Barbe' ° goes far in supporting the trial
judge who fails to make a finding. The case has been extensively
cited, and holds: 1. It is not the function of the court of appeals
to make findings of fact which a trial court should have made. 2. But
not every case where there is a failure to make findings must be
sent back to the District Court. 3. Reversal is not demanded "if
a full understanding of the question presented may be had without
aid of separate findings." 4. Another exception exists where the
record considered as a whole does not present a genuine issue as to
any material facts.
We cite the decision not because of its author (District Judge
James M. Carter) but because it illustrates instances where a re-
versal could be avoided where there is a lack of findings. Judge
Heely dissented and criticized the trial judge for not making a find-
ing and wound up with what is probably a correct statement- "It
has remained for my associates to attempt laboriously a making of
such a finding for him, in effect converting this appellate tribunal
into a trial court."''
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has not been to sermonize but rather
to stress the importance of "fact-finding." In retrospect then we would
like to emphasize several of the key areas.
Of primary importance are the purposes served by the findings
of fact. They assist the trial court in the adjudication process. They
serve other courts where the issues of res judicata or estoppel by
148 Lundgren, 307 F. 2d at 115.
'4, See Kostelack v. United States, 247 F. 2d 723 (9th Cir. 1957).
150 232 F. 2d 939 (9th Cir. 1956).
151 Id. at 949.
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judgment are involved. Here, it would be well to keep in mind the
need for preciseness. Lastly, they inform the reviewing court of the
basis of the judgment, keeping in mind here the requirement of ex-
plicitness.
We saw above that all the circuits except the Ninth have de-
nounced the practice of having counsel prepare the findings. Here, we
cannot agree with the majority. Much of the court's valuable time can
be saved by having counsel submit findings. Counsel may suggest
findings a court may have missed. Finally, if the court con-
scientiously studies them prior to adoption or modification, they in
actuality become those of the court.
Careless fact-finding or "sewing up" by fitting the facts to legal
principles can negate an appeal due to the "clearly erroneous" doc-
trine. Because of this, the necessity for diligence and integrity on the
part of the fact-finder should be obvious.
We also saw the divergent views as to whether a reviewing court
is bound by a trial court's findings, unless clearly erroneous, when
the issues are decided on written evidence. The "Clark" view ad-
vocates the rule that the trial court's findings are binding. The
"Frank" view espouses the rule that a reviewing court could just
as easily make its own conclusions. The difficulty in following this
last theory is that it leaves no single fact-finding tribunal. The trial
court's findings should be binding or ultimately the Supreme Court
becomes a trial court.
Finally, we have seen that the failure to make findings is not
always fatal. In Yanish v. Barber,52 the court stretched to make
a finding that should have been made by the trial court. However,
least this case becomes too consolatory, we reiterate the statement
made in ICC v. Cardinale Trucking Corp.: ' "[U]nless the court
below makes,.., in conformity with Rule 52 (a), clear and concise
statements of the ultimate facts of the case,... the matter will be
forthwith remanded in order that such findings be made."' 4
In concluding then it should be said that this phase of the law
is not unlike any other, in that, THERE IS NO BLACK OR WHITE.
252 Ibid.
253 308 F. 2d 435 (3d Cir. 1962).
154 Id. at 437.
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